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1 Introduction 
Recently models have been developed in which trade is conducted through sequential pairwise 
random matching between agents who bargain strategically over prices. These models provide 
a means of determining whether decentralized trading processes lead to nearly competitive out-
comes when trading frictions are small (see for example, Gale [4} or Rubinstein and Wolinsky [8D. 
In addition, the models are useful in explaining how bargaining procedures, rates of impatience, 
and outside options affect market outcomes (for example Wolinsky [9J). 
The present paper focuses on markets where trade is carried out through matching and 
bargaining and where at each date t = 0,1, ... a finite and exogenously given number of agents 
enters. l Such markets are "small" in the sense that at each date the number of agents in 
the market is finite. Thus, an agent's decision on whether to trade with his current partner 
influences the number of each type of agent in the market at subsequent dates. Since matching 
probabilities are determined by these numbers, an agent's decision whether or not to trade also 
influences matching probabilities at subsequent dates. 
In the present paper, there are two questions of primary interest. First, does the equilibrium 
of a small market converge to the equilibrium of a limit market with a continuum of agents as the 
small market becomes large? The existing literature on markets in which an infinite measure of 
agents eventually enters assumes that there is a continuum of agents or that the market behaves 
as if there were a continuum of agents. In that case, whether or not a given match ends with 
trade has no effect on the measure of each type of agent in the market at the next date. We 
refer to markets with this property as "large." The second question of interest is whether the 
equilibrium of a small market is near the equilibrium of the associated large market. 
As a useful analogy, the same kinds of limiting questions have been intensively investigated 
for exchange economies. Hildenbrand [5} gave conditions under which the core converges to 
the competitive equilibrium as a finite economy converges to its continuum limit. Anderson [I} 
gives a bound on the non-competitiveness of a fixed finite economy. In the present paper, in 
the context of a matching and bargaining model, we obtain a Hildenbrand-like result on the 
IThese are markets such as the housing market where market activity continues indefinitely. 
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convergence of equilibria of small markets to the equilibrium of a large market. We also show 
that there is no analog to the Anderson type bound on the difference between the equilibrium 
of a small market and the equilibrium of the associated large market. 
To address our first question, we consider for a small market a model similar to that in 
Rubinstein and Wolinsky [8] (henceforth referred to as RW). We show there is a unique sym-
metric equilibrium in stationary strategies satisfying a natural assumption on beliefs following 
off-the-equilibrium-path play. In this equilibrium, if there is an excess of sellers when the market 
opens, then sellers receive a higher payoff than they do in the equilibrium of the associated large 
market. Sellers continue to receive a higher payoff in the small market than they do in the large 
market even as both markets become frictionless. Nonetheless, as the small market becomes 
large, the small market equilibrium converges to the equilibrium of a large market. 2 
When comparing the equilibria of small and large markets, we compare markets in which 
the matching probability of each type of agent is the same across markets. Therefore, given 
a small market and a matching process the associated large market is the one with matching 
probabilities equal to the equilibrium-path matching probabilities of the small market. Since 
equilibrium-path matching probabilities are the same in a small market and the associated 
large market, differences in the equilibria arise solely from the fact that in a small market a 
matched agent's decision whether or not to trade with his current partner influences matching 
probabilities. 
To address our second question on the nearness of equilibria of small and large markets, 
we study a small market for a one-parameter family of matching processes. We find that the 
equilibrium of a small market need not be near the equilibrium of the associated large market. 
To be precise, consider a small market where at each date n buyers and n sellers enter and 
where there is an initial excess of ~ > 0 sellers. For any matching process in the family under 
consideration, the equilibrium-path matching probabilities are the same and equal to a = n~~ 
for sellers and f3 = 1 for buyers. Moreover, there is a matching process in this family such that 
2For the purpose of comparison the equilibrium outcome obtained in RW, where the matching probability 
of each type of agent is a primitive of the model, is taken as the benchmark for the large market outcome. 
Osborne and Rubinstein [7], p. 141, in their discussion of this model, assert that taking matching probabilities 
as a primitive is appropriate in a large market. Strictly speaking, when entry is exogenous, an agent must have 
measure zero if it is to have no influence on its matching probability. 
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sellers obtain a share of the gains to trade arbitrarily close to ! as frictions vanish. (This is 
the case even though in a small market n and ~ may be arbitrarily large.) In contrast, in the 
associated large market, as frictions vanish, sellers obtain a share of the surplus Ct{3 which is 
Ct+ 
strictly less than !. 
The market equilibrium of a small market depends on the matching process in an essential 
way: when the discount factor is less than one, the market equilibrium depends on the matching 
probabilities that are reached both on and off the equilibrium path. As the discount factor 
approaches one, however, the equilibrium depends only on off-the-equilibrium-path matching 
probabilities. This contrasts sharply with the situation in RW, where the equilibrium charac-
terization depends only on the steady state equilibrium matching probability of each type of 
agent. 
Of course, only equilibrium-path matching probabilities are ever observed. Thus, two small 
markets which have different matching processes but which to an observer appear identical (i.e. 
have the same number of agents and the same equilibrium-path matching probabilities) may 
have very different equilibria. For this reason, when the matching process is unknown, it would 
be difficult to determine empirically whether or not behavior in a small market is consistent 
with the theoretical outcome. 
2 A Model of a Small Market 
Price formation is modeled as a game in discrete time. To describe the game requires specifying 
the size of the pool of agents who can potentially be matched, how the pool evolves over time 
given the stream of entrants, and the characteristics of the two types of agents in the pool. Also 
required is a description of the matching process, the rules of the bargaining game played by 
matched pairs of agents, and the information of agents. 
The Market: The market at date zero consists of nbuyers and n+~ sellers. At each subsequent 
date a stream of n buyers and n sellers enters the market. An agent who enters at date T is 
said to be a generation T agent. We consider the case where ~ > O. The case where there is 
initially an excess of buyers is symmetric. 
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The Agents: Each seller is endowed with a single indivisible unit of the good and has a reservation 
price of zero. Each buyer is endowed with a unit of money and demands a single unit of the 
indivisible good with a reservation price of one. Thus, there is a one unit gain to trade in any 
match. Agents are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers and discount the 
future using the discount factor 8 < 1. A generation T agent who receives a share z of the unit 
gain to trade at date t ~ T has utility 8t - T z. 
Matching: At each date, each buyer remaining in the market is randomly matched to a seller. 
Each seller is matched to a buyer with a probability equal to the ratio of buyers to sellers in 
the market. At date zero, for example, each seller is matched with probability n/(n + A). If a 
seller is not matched, he takes no action and remains in the market at the next date. 
Bargaining: Once a buyer and seller are matched, each has probability one half of being selected 
as the proposer. The proposer offers to his partner a share of the unit gain to trade. If his partner 
agrees, each member of the partnership receives his proposed share and both exit. If his partner 
disagrees then no trade takes place, the match is broken, and both agents remain in the market 
at the next date. 
Information and Histories: At each date every agent in the market is informed as to whether 
he is matched. A matched agent is informed whether he is selected to propose a division of the 
surplus or to respond to his partner's proposal. If the agent is selected to respond, then he is 
also informed of his partner's proposal. Finally, for an agent selected to propose, following his 
proposal, he is informed whether his offer has been accepted or rejected. In addition, each agent 
has perfect recall of his own moves and the information listed above. 
We distinguish among four types of histories for an agent who is in the market for the tth 
time.3 Let Bb denote the set of such histories ending with the information that the agent is 
matched and selected to propose. Let Bh denote the set of such histories where the agent has 
been selected to respond and has just observed his partner's offer. Let iJt denote the set of such 
histories where the agent was matched, but his match has just ended without trade. Finally, 
3A generation T agent is in the market for the tth time at date T + t - 1. 
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denote by Ht the set of histories ending with the information that the agent was not matched 
when in the market for the tth time. A history in Ht or ilt contains all the information collected 
in t periods of market experience. 
A market strategy for an agent is an offer for each history where the agent is selected to 
propose and a response for each history ending with an offer. 
A market strategy is a sequence of decision rules j = {P}~l such that P : Hb ~ [0,1] and 
P : Hh ~ {"Y", "N"} Vt ~ 1. 
The market strategies of sellers and buyers are denoted by j and g, respectively. Let S denote 
the set of all market strategies. 
A market strategy j is stationary if Vt, u ~ 1 then (i) ht E Hb and hU E H~ implies 
P(ht) = jU(hU) and (ii) ht E Hh and hUE HR implies P(ht) = jU(hU) whenever ht and hUboth 
end with the same offer. If an agent's strategy is stationary, the agent makes the same offer 
whenever selected to propose and the agent's decision whether to accept or to reject an offer 
depends only on the offer. Let S denote the set of stationary strategies. 
Let UI (f, g)( h) denote the value to a generation T seller with history h when all sellers 
employ the stationary strategy j and all buyers employ the stationary strategy 9. Define 
UI (f'; j, 9)( h) to be the same value except that the seller employs the strategy l' (not necessarily 
stationary), while all other sellers employ the stationary strategy f. In a similar manner define 
Uh (f, g)( h) and Uh (g'; j, g)(h) for buyers. Shortly we make an assumption which guarantees 
that these values are well defined for all histories. 
A market equilibrium [Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1985]: is a pair of stationary strategies 
(f., g.) such that for all histories h 
UI(f.,g.)(h) ~ UI(f';j.,g.)(h) VI' E S, VT ~ 0 
and 
Uh(f.,g.)(h) ~ Uh(g'jj.,g.)(h) Vg' E S, VT ~ O. 
In a market equilibrium each agent's strategy is optimal following every history, including his-
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tories inconsistent with equilibrium play. Further, the strategy of each agent is optimal over all 
market strategies, not just stationary strategies. 
The value UIU,g)(h) depends not only upon the bargaining strategies of potential partners, 
but also depends upon a seller's expectation that he is matched at future dates. If, as in RW, 
matching probabilities are a primitive of the model, then that all agents of the same type play 
the same stationary strategy is sufficient to insure that each agent's value is well defined for 
every history. In a small market, however, the stock of each type of agent in the market, and 
hence the probability that an agent is matched, depends upon the market history. In fact, in a 
small market the outcome of a single match influences the matching probability of sellers at the 
next date: if a matched agent fails to trade, then he and his partner remain in the market at the 
next date increasing the stock of each type of agent by one over what it would have otherwise 
been. This has at least the effect of increasing the matching probability of all sellers in the 
market at the next date.4 
Let pT (h t) denote the probability that a generation T seller assigns to the event that he is 
matched at date T + t given history ht E Ht U iIt. For j, 9 E 5, denote by 1f,g the probability 
a match ends with trade when the seller employs j and the buyer employs g. When all buyers 
employ 9 and all other sellers employ j, we assume that a seller computes PT(h t ) on the basis 
that each match in which he was not a member has ended with trade with probability 1f,g·5 
For a history ht on the equilibrium path, PT(h t ) computed in this fashion coincides with the 
probability obtained from Bayes' rule. For histories off the equilibrium path, however, Bayes' 
rule no longer applies and then this assumption has force. Suppose, for example, a seller has 
a history ht E iIt (perhaps off the equilibrium path), all buyers employ 9 E 5, all other sellers 
employ j E 5, and that 1f,g =1. Then the seller computes PT(h t ) on the basis that each match 
other than his own (both at the current and previous dates) has ended with trade. Therefore, 
the only buyers in the market at the next date will be the buyer with whom the seller has just 
4Whether the effect extends beyond the next date depends, in general, upon the matching technology and 
the probability that a matched pair of agents trades. 
5This assumption is similar in spirit to the assumption implicit in Gale [3] that having observed off-equilibrium-
path play an agent does not take this as evidence a positive measure of agents having deviated from equilibrium 
play. (See Osborne and Rubinstein [7] pp. 161-162 for a discussion of this assumption.) The assumption in the 
current paper is that the observation of off-equilibrium-path play in ones own matches is not taken as evidence 
that other agents in other matches have deviated from equilibrium play. 
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failed to trade plus the n buyers entering at the next date. Consequently, the seller expects to 
be matched at the next date with probability (n + l)j(n +~ +1). 
We now give the recursion equation satisfied by UIU';j,g)(h t). When a seller employs 
j' E S, had history ht immediately prior to becoming matched, and his partner employs 9 E 5, 
then define 'Y!"g(ht) to be the probability that the match ends with trade and define S, (ht)
/ ,g 
to be the seller's expected gain conditional on the match ending with trade.6 Given a seller has 
history ht E Ht uiIt and expects to be matched with probability PT(ht) then random matching, 
1', and 9 induce a probability distribution over histories at the next date. Let F( ht, 1', g) denote 
the induced probability distribution over histories in Ht+l conditional on a seller being matched 
his t + pt time in the market, but the match ends without trade. The value UIU';j,g)(ht) for 
a seller with history ht E Ht U Ht satisfies 
UIU'; j, 9)(ht) = 8PT(ht)bJ',g(ht)S/',g (ht) +(1 - 'YJ',g(ht))EheHI+dUIU'; j, g)(h) IF]] 
+8(1 - PT(ht))UIU'jj,g)(ht x (unmatched)), 
(1) 
where EheHI+l[UIU'ij,9)(h)IFJ is the seller's expected value conditional on his match ending 
without trade where the expectation is taken with respect to F.The value U'h(g'; j,g)(ht) for a 
buyer with history ht E Ht satisfies a similar recursion equation. 
3 Characterizing the Market Equilibrium 
This section characterizes the market equilibrium and establishes that a market equilibrium 
exists. We do not restrict attention to equilibria where matching probabilities are stationary. 
In the unique market equilibrium, the market converges to a steady state in one period. In 
period zero sellers are matched with probability n~~ and, along the equilibrium path, sellers 
are matched with probability n~~ in each subsequent period.7 
6If 'Yjl,g(ht ) = 0 then define S,,)ht ) = O. 
7In a large market the evolution of the stock of each type of agent (and each types matching probability) 
is taken to be deterministic by a (usually) implicit appeal to a law of large numbers. This is despite the fact 
that there are well know problems with applying the law of large numbers when there are a continuum of Li.d. 
random variables. (See Feldman and Gilles [2].) This is another reason to model small markets. 
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THEOREM 1: A market equilibrium (J.. ,g.. ), if it exists, is unique and 'It :?: 1 satisfies: 
f;( ht) 
- VJ Vh t E Hb 
-
"y" Vht E Hit ending with an offer of vi or greater 
- "N" Vht E Hit ending with an offer less than Vi 
and 
g;(ht ) 
-
vg Vh t E Hb 
-
"y" Vht E Hit ending with an offer of VJ or greater 
-
"N" Vht E Hit ending with an offer less than Vl 
where 
,\+(1-6)(1->.) 6(1->')v:d - 0 n+~+1 V;Bd -- o 1- n+~:2:I:= , S - 2-8(1-'\)(1+ n+l+1) 2-6(1-'\)(1+ n+~+1) 
and ,\ = n~~ is the steady state equilibrium path matching probability of sellers. 
Proof: Appendix. 
Theorem 2 shows that a market equilibrium exists. The key to obtaining existence of a 
market equilibrium in this environment is that the probability an agent assigns to the event 
that he is matched at the next date only depends upon whether he is matched or unmatched at 
the current date. In this case, an agent's problem of choosing an optimal strategy is equivalent 
to a Markov decision problem. 
THEOREM 2: (J.. ,g.. ) as given in Theorem 1 is a market equilibrium. 
Proof: Appendix. 
Comparing Small and Large Markets 
In this section we compare the equilibrium outcomes of small and large markets, taking the 
equilibrium obtained in RW as the benchmark for the equilibrium of a large market. In the RW 
model type 1 and 2 agents meet new partners with probability Q' and (3 respectively (whether 
or not currently matched). Once matched each agent in the match has an equal probability of 
being selected to propose. If a proposal is rejected the match is not necessarily broken (unlike in 
the present paper). The match dissolves only if one or both of the agents meet a new partner. 
8 
In this case the agent(s) meeting a new partner is assumed to abandon its current partner and 
begin bargaining with the new partner. 
The bargaining procedure in the current paper can be seen as a special case of the procedure 
in RW for Q = A and f3 = 1 when type 1 and 2 agents are interpreted as sellers and buyers, 
respectively, and A is the steady state equilibrium-path matching probability of sellers in the 
small market. At each date a buyer begins bargaining with a new seller. A seller, however, finds 
a partner with probability A= n~A' In the market equilibrium of RW when Q = Aand f3 = 1, 
then sellers offer 2-d1->.) and receive offers of 2_6~~_>.r8 
In the equilibrium of a small market sellers make smaller offers and receive larger offers than 
they do in the equilibrium of the associated large market.9 In the small market sellers offer 
V~ (see Theorem 1) which is less than 2-6(~->.r10 In the small market sellers receive offers of 
Vj which is greater than 2-6~;->')' It follows immediately that unmatched sellers have a higher 
expected payoff in a small market than in the associated large market. 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In a small market, following the rejection 
of an offer, a seller is matched at the next date with probability n~!~1 which is greater than the 
equilibrium-path matching probability n~A' In the associated large market a seller's matching 
probability upon rejecting a offer remains n~A' Thus, a seller has a higher expected payoff 
when rejecting an offer in the small market and, therefore, receives larger offers since in a 
market equilibrium an agent receives an offer just equal to its payoff when rejecting the offer, 
More surprisingly, sellers receive larger offers and make smaller offers in the small market 
even as it becomes frictionless. In the small market we have 
1 l-~ 
1, lId -~~ d l' lId >.1m6_1 VB = (>.)( ) an 1m6_1 Vs = 2-(1->.)(1+-1-)2- 1- 1+ n+.:>+l n+':>+l 
In contrast, in the associated large market sellers offer 1~>' and receive offers of 1~>' as b ap-
proaches one. 
SIn RW a type 1 agent when selected to propose receives z. = 2(l-6)+~(~:~~~~~~16;Q)(l-,8) and offers to his 
partner 1 - z •. (See page 1145 of RW.) Substituting A for a and 1 for {3 in 1 - z. gives 2-6t1-X)' 
9Recall that given a small market and a matching process, the associated large market is the one with matching 
probabilities equal to the equilibrium-path matching probabilities of the small market. 
10Notice that 2_16(:~\)N~f) evaluated at f =0 gives the large market offer of sellers, while the same expression 
evaluated at f =_1_ gives the small market offer. That sellers make smaller offers in the small market follows n+A+1 
d ( 1-6(1->')f ) < 0from t he fact t hat df 2-6(1->')(1+f) . 
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We now address the question of whether the equilibrium of the small market converges to the 
equilibrium of a large market as the small market becomes large. Consider a sequence of small 
markets {ni, ~i, nd~l' Small market i begins at date zero with ni +~i sellers and ni buyers. At 
each subsequent date an additional ni agents of each type enter. The equilibrium-path matching 
probability of sellers and buyers in small market i is ni~i~i and 1, respectively. We now state 
the convergence result. 
COROLLARY 1: Let {ni, ~i, ni}~l be a sequence of small markets such that limi_oo ni~i~i = ). 
and limi_oo ni + ~i = 00. As i -+ 00 the sequence of small market equilibria converges to the 
equilibrium of the large market where sellers and buyers are matched with probability). and 1, 
respectively. 
Proof: Let V~(i) and Vi(i) denote the offers made and received by sellers, respectively, in the 
'l'b' f 11 k t' B Th 1 lld(') 6(1-n6(~:;'\)1)
eqUll num 0 sma mar e z. y eorem, VB z = 2-6(1-.\i)(1+~i+t+l)' where ).i = ni~i~i' 
Writing the expression for Vl( i) and taking limits gives 
1, lld( ') 6 and l' lld(') 6), 0i~~ VB Z = 2 _ 6(1 _ ).) i~~ Vs Z = 2 - 6(1 _ ).) 
The results heretofore show that the equilibrium of a small market and the associated large 
market differ, but the difference becomes small when (holding the matching process fixed) the 
small market becomes large (i.e. n and/or ~ become large). In the next section we show that 
the equilibrium of any fixed small market and the associated large market are not near for some 
matching processes. 
Nearness of Equilibria of Small and Large Markets 
This section considers a matching model for a one-parameter family of matching processes. We 
show that for any matching process in this family, the equilibrium of a small market depends on 
both on- and off-the-equilibrium-path matching probabilities. Moreover, as the discount factor 
approaches one, the equilibrium depends only on off-the-equilibrium-path matching probabili-
ties. Our main result is that the equilibrium of a small market need not be near the equilibrium 
of the associated large market as both markets become frictionless. 
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As before, the market at date zero consists of n buyers and n+ ~ sellers and at each 
subsequent date a stream of n buyers and n sellers enters. The model in the present section 
differs from the one studied earlier with respect to the information received by players and the 
matching process. Following entry at each date, every agent in the market is informed of the 
number of buyers in the market. Of this number, n are new entrants and k remain from previous 
periods. The matching process, parameterized by an integer k* 2:: 0, operates as follows: when 
n +k buyers (and, therefore, n +k+~ sellers) are in the market, the process produces n matches 
if k :S k* and it produces n + k - k* matches if k > k*. In all other respects the model is the 
same as described in section 2. 
An agent's strategy is semi-stationary if the agent's offer when selected to propose depends 
only on the number of buyers in the market and the agent's response to an offer depends only 
on the number of buyers and the offer received. For any given k* there is a unique market 
equilibrium in semi-stationary strategies, and in this equilibrium each match ends with trade,u 
For brevity we omit the game theoretic details of this argument as they parallel the proofs of 
Theorems 1 and 2 and contribute no additional insight. Instead we focus on the value equations 
characterizing the market equilibrium. 
For matching process k* let v?(k*) denote the value to an agent of type i when the agent 
is unmatched, prior to random matching, and n + k buyers are in the market. Suppressing the 
dependence of V:k on k*, the value equations for matching process k* are 
for 0 :S k :S k* : V; 
-
Qk[!(1- 8vA+l) + !8V;+l] +(1 - Qk)8V; 
VA - t'k[!(1- 8V;+l) + !8vA+l] +(1 - t'k)8VA 
and (2) 
for k > k* : v; 
-
Qk[!(1 - 8vf+l) + !8vf+l] +(1 - Qk)8Vf 
VA - t'k[!(1- 8vf+l) + !8vf+l] +(1 - t'k)8Vf, 
n'f k < k* - ntk-k* 'f k k* (.l - n 'f k < k* d (.l - ntk-k* ifwereh Qk = nt~tk 1 _ ,Qk - nt~tk 1 > ,fJk - ntk 1 _ ,an fJk - ntk 
k > k". These equations reflect the fact that if there are n +k buyers in the market and k :S k* 
then there are n matches and n +k +1 buyers in the market at the next period if exactly one 
of these matches ends in disagreement. If there are n + k buyers and k > k* then there are 
11 Assuming that an off-the-equilibrium-path offer is not taken as evidence of deviations from equilibrium play 
in concurrent matches. 
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n + k - k* matches and n + k* + 1 buyers in the market at the next period if exactly one of 
these matches ends in disagreement. Thus if there are n + k buyers in the market, a matched 
seller's disagreement payoff is 6V;+1 if k ~ k* and is 6V;"+1 if k > k*. 
Values are defined by the infinite system of simultaneous linear equations given above. Nev-
ertheless, one can characterize the solution by focusing on the four equations for k = k* and 
k = k* + 1. Solving, one obtains 
and (3) 
where Ako = O:ko - O:k0+! and Bko = I3ko -l3ko+1.12 
To describe the equilibrium-path evolution of the market it is convenient to take it to be 
equal to n. Then, on the equilibrium path, at each date zero buyers remain in the market from 
previous periods since each buyer is matched and each match ends with trade. Therefore, the 
equilibrium payoffs to sellers and buyers are Vj(k*) and V~(k*), respectively. On the equilibrium 
path, sellers when selected to propose offer 6VA(k*) and buyers when selected to propose offer 
6VJ(k*). If there are n + k buyers in the market and k > 0, then the market has moved off the 
equilibrium path. In this case, sellers offer 6vA+1(k*) and buyers offer 6vA+1(k*). 
Given (3), Vj(k*) and V~(k*) can be computed recursively using 
1 
1I,k(k*) = 20: k (1 _ 611,k+1(k*) +611,k+1(k*)) (4)
s 1 _ 6(1 _ O:k) B s' 
which follows from (2) for k ~ k*. It is immediate that when the discount factor is positive but 
less than one, Vj(k*) and V~(k*) depend not only on equilibrium-path matching probabilities 
0:0 and 130, but also depend on the off-the-equilibrium-path matching probabilities 0:1, •.• ,O:kO+1 
and 131, ... ,l3ko+1. 
Theorem 4, which follows, shows that as frictions vanish equilibrium payoffs depend only on 
the off-the-equilibrium-path matching probabilities O:ko, O:kO+1, I3ko, and I3ko+1' To understand 
this result it is useful to recall that in the RW model of a large market the equilibrium payoff 
to a seller as frictions vanish is 
0: 1 (5)0:+13= l+ Q ' 
Clt 
12 
where a and f3 are the matching probabilities of sellers and buyers, respectively. As frictions 
vanish payoffs depend upon the ratio of matching probabilities, not their magnitudes. In a 
small market with matching process k·, by rejecting a sequence of k· or more offers, a seller 
permanently reduces the matching probability of sellers from ao to ako and of buyers from f30 
to f3ko. This also reduces the ratio of the matching probabilities from A to &., which from 
00 0/c0 
(5) increases the seller's payoff. In a market equilibrium a seller receives offers sufficiently large 
so that such manipulation is not carried out. Thus in a small market, as frictions vanish, it 
is the matching probabilities that would prevail after manipulation that determine payoffs, not 
equilibrium-path matching probabilities, 
l' l/O(k·) °ko(1+Bko) d l' lTO(k·) I3k o(1+A ko)THEOREM 3· 
• 6~ IS = ok.(I+Bko)+l3k.(1+Ak.) an 6~ VB = o/co(1+B/co)+l3ko(1+Akor 
· Th t I' lTkO(k·) - 0 I+B 0 d l' lTk" (k·) - 13 I+A ~ol-0 0 0P roof . a. 6~ Vs - Ok. (I+Bko +l3kO I+Ak. an 6~ vB - Ok. I+Bko +l3k. I+AkO) l' 
lows from (3). For i ~ 0, let P(i) be the proposition "lim6.....1 V~(k·) = lim6..... 1 V{(k·), 
lim6.....1 V~(k·) = lim6..... 1 Vf(k·), and i ~ k· ." P(i) is obviously true for i = k·, We show 
P( i) is true and i > 0 implies P(i-I) is true. 
That P(i) is true and i > 0 implies 0 ~ i-I < k·, For k = i -1 we have from (4) that 
Taking limits gives 
where the first equality follows from the fact that P(i) is true and the second follows from the fact 
that 1 - lim6.....1 Vf(k·) = lim6.....1 V{(k·). The symmetric argument gives lim6.....1 V~-I(k·) = 
lim6..... 1 Vf(k·). Therefore, P(i - 1) is true. By induction P(i) is true for 0 < z < k·. In 
particular it is true for i = 0, which is the result. 0 
Finally, we show that the equilibrium of a small market with an arbitrary but finite number 
of agents need not be near the equilibrium its associated large market. In the small market the 
equilibrium-path matching probability of sellers is ao = n~A < 1 and of buyers is f30 = 1 for 
any matching process k·, Thus, for any matching technology in this family the associated large 
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market is the same. Corollary 2 shows that there is matching process with k* sufficiently large 
such that sellers obtain a share of the surplus arbitrarily close to ! as frictions vanish. 
COROLLARY 2: limko_oo lim6_1 Vj(k*) = !. 
Proof: 
lim lim vj(k*) = lim 1 _ 1 
ko-oo 6-1 ko-oo 1 + ,6ko (1+Ako) 2 
0kO (1+B k o) 
where the first equality follows from Theorem 3 and the second equality follows from the fact 
· ° I+A k o 1 0that 1lmko_oo Ok· I+B) = .k. 
In contrast, in the associated large market, sellers obtain a share of the surplus oo~,6o < ~ 
as fictions vanish. We conclude that the equilibrium of a small market need not be near the 
equilibrium of the associated large market. The potential difference of the equilibria is increasing 
as n~~ decreases. 
6 Conclusion 
We have shown that the equilibrium of a small market converges to the equilibrium of a large 
market with a continuum of agents as the small market becomes large. Nonetheless, for any 
fixed small market there are matching processes such that the equilibrium of the small market 
is not near the equilibrium of its continuum limit. Hence, a market with a continuum of agents 
may not be a good approximation of markets with a finite number of agents. The results of the 
preceding section suggest that a continuum model will only be a good approximation of a finite 
model if in the finite model the matching process has the property that agents can effect only 
small changes in matching probabilities. 
7 Appendix 
Before proving Theorem 1, it is convenient to prove some preliminary results for the situation 
where all sellers employ f E S and all buyers employ 9 E S. In this case, the sum of the values 
of a generation zero buyer and seller whose match has just ended without trade is less than one 
14 
(Lemma l(a)). The value to a generation zero buyer is the same for all histories where his match 
ended without trade his first time in the market (Lemma l(b)). The value to a generation zero 
seller who is unmatched at the end of his first time in the market depends only upon whether 
his match ended without trade or whether he was not matched (Lemma 1 (c) and (d)). 
LEMMA 1: Let 1,g E S. Then (a) 'Vh,h E HI u Jp : U~(f,g)(h) + U~(J,g)(h) < 1, (b) 
'Vh,h E Jp : U~(J,g)(h) = U~(f,g)(h), (c) 'Vh,h E Jp : U~(f,g)(h) = U~(J,g)(h), and (d) 
'Vh, h E HI : U~(f, g)(h) = U~(J, g)(h). 
Proof: If Ij,9 = 0, then U~(f,g)(h) = U~(f,g)(h) = 0 'Vh E HluJp and the result is immediate. 
If Ij,9 > 0 then Sj,g and Bj,g, the expected gain of a seller and buyer conditional on their match 
ending with trade are well defined and do not depend upon a history. For h E HI U Jp we can 
write 
(6) 
where Ci(h) represents the probability of matching and trading at date i given history h E 
HI U Jp. To illustrate, we compute Cl (h). Given history h E Jp, for example, the seller was 
matched at date zero and so there were n- 1 other matches. Further, a seller computes his 
probability of matching on the basis that each match in which he was not a member has ended 
with trade with probability Ij,9' If x of these n- 1 other matches ended with trade, then the 
seller is matched with probability n~t~A:'x at date one. Therefore, 
C (h) = ~ (n - 1) x (1 _ )n-X-I n+n - x . 
1 ~ Ij,g Ij,9 A + + A 
x=o X n n u - x 
That CI(h) +C2(h) +... ::; 1 implies U~(f,g)(h) ::; bSj,g. We can also write U~(f,g)(h) as 
(7) 
Part (a) follows since Sj,g +Bj,g = 1 and b < 1. 
It is immediate from (7) that 'Vh, h E Jp : U~(f,g)(h) = U~(f,g)(h). Since the probability 
a seller with history h matches and trades at date t depends only upon whether h is in Jp 
or in Ht, it follows immediately from (6) that 'Vh,h E Jp : U~(f,g)(h) = U~(f,g)(h) and 
'Vh, hE HI : U~(J,g)(h) = U~(f,g)(h). 0 
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A simple bargaining game is now introduced. Lemma 2 characterizes its unique perfect 
equilibrium. Lemma 3 establishes the relationship between a market equilibrium and the perfect 
equilibrium of the bargaining game with suitably chosen disagreement payoffs. 
A seller and buyer are matched. Each agent has equal probability of being selected 
as the proposer. The proposer offers to his partner a share of the unit gain to trade. 
If his partner accepts the offer then the gain is divided as proposed and each agent's 
payoff is the share he receives. If his partner rejects the offer then the seller and 
buyer receive the disagreement payoffs V; > °and V~ > 0, respectively, where 
Vi + V~ < 1. 
The set of histories that the seller or buyer may observe in the bargaining game is precisely 
Hb U Hh. A strategy is defined as follows. 
A bargaining strategy is a decision rule j such that j : Hb --+ [0, 1] and j : Hh --+ {"Y", "N"}. 
The bargaining strategies of the seller and buyer are denoted by j and g, respectively. Let S 
denote the set of all bargaining strategies. 
LEMMA 2: There exists a unique perfect equilibrium (j, g) of the bargaining game where 
j(h1 ) - V~ Vh1 E Hb 
"Y" Vh1 E Hh ending with an offer of V; or greater 
_ "N" Vh1 E Hh ending with an offer less than V; 
and 
g(h1 ) _ V; Vh1 E Hb 
"Y" Vh1 E Hh ending with an offer of V~ or greater 
_ "N" Vh1 E Hh ending with an of fer less than Vl 
Proof of Lemma 2: For h E Hh perfection requires the seller accept offers greater than V; 
and reject offers less than V;. In a perfect equilibrium the seller also accepts offers of V; since 
otherwise there is no best offer for the buyer when selected to propose. The symmetric argument 
shows in a perfect equilibrium the buyer accepts only offers of V; or greater. For h E Hb the 
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seller makes the minimum acceptable offer of V~ and has the payoff 1 - V~. Offering less than 
V~, the seller's payoff is Vi < 1 - Vl 0 
LEMMA 3: If U., g.) is a market equilibrium, then (j, g) = U!, gl) is a perfect equilibrium of 
the bargaining game where, for hE fp, Vi == ugU.,g.)(h) and V~ =U~U.,g.)(h). 
Proof: V~ and Vi are both well defined given Lemma 1 (b) and (c). Let Ui(J,g)(h) be the value 
to an agent of type i E {S, E} in the bargaining game when the seller employs j, the buyer 
employs g, and the agent has history h. For a seller matched at date zero in the market game, 
the market strategies f. and g. generate the same probability distribution over outcomes ending 
with trade at date zero and the outcome of no trade at date zero as do the bargaining strategies 
j and 9 in the bargaining game. Further, the payoff to a matched seller is Vi in both games 
should the outcome of the seller's match be no trade. Therefore, ugU.,g.)(h) = Us(j,g)(h) 
'rIh E Hb U Hh and, by the symmetric argument, U~U.,g.)(h) = UB(J,g)(h) 'rIh E Hb U Hh. 
Now suppose (J, g) is not a perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. Then there is a 
history h E Hb U Hh such that the strategy of either the seller or the buyer is not optimal. 
Without loss of generality suppose the seller's bargaining strategy is not optimal given h. Then 
there exists a bargaining strategy ]I such that Us(J\g)(h) > Us(j,g)(h). 
For the market game now consider the market strategy j, where ]I - P and it = f; 
for t > 1. As defined, j differs from f. only on Hb U Hh. By the same argument as before 
U~(,j; f.,g.)(h) = Us (]I ,g)(h) 'rIh E Hb U HA. Thus, we have shown 
which contradicts that U., g.) is a market equilibrium. 0 
We are now prepared to prove Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Let U.,g.) be a market equilibrium. By Lemma l(a), ugU.,g.)(h) + 
U~U.,g.)(h) < 1 'rIh,h E fp. Lemma 2 characterizes the perfect equilibrium (j,g) of the 
bargaining game with disagreement payoffs Vi and V~ when Vi + V~ < 1. By Lemma 3, for 
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hE fp, when Vi = U~(J.,g.)(h) and VJ = U~(J.,g.)(h) then (j,g) = (J;,g!). Since!. and g. 
are stationary, !; and g! determine !. and g•. Thus !. and g. are of the form in the theorem. 
We now shown that the market equilibrium is unique. We have 'l.,g. = 1 and Sl.,g. = 
.5Vi + .5(1 - VJ). Then (1) reduces to 
Since 'l.,g. = 1, then PT(ht) = PT(hU) = n~~ 'Vht E Ht, 'Vhu E HU. A seller unmatched his 
tth time in the market computes PT(ht) on the basis that each match at date T + t - 1 ended 
with trade with probability one. Thus, he assigns probability n~~ to the event he is matched 
at date T + t. By the same argument, the seller assigns the same probability to the event he is 
matched at date T + u when unmatched his uth time in the market. This fact and (8) implies, 
for any t and u, that 
Since'Vl = 1 then PT(ht) = PT(hU ) = ----!l:.±.!.- 'Vht E h t 'VhuE hu. If a seller's current matchI .,g. , n+~+I' 
ends without trade, then given each other match has ended with trade with probability one he 
assigns probability n~Z~l to the event he is matched at the next date. Thus, (8) implies, for 
any t and u, that 
Given the preceding remarks we have for anyt that Vi = U~(J.,g.)(ht)'Vht E Ht. Forh E HI 
define Vs = U~(J.,g.)(h). (Vs is an unmatched seller's value after random matching and is well 
defined by Lemma l(d).) The preceding remarks also imply that for any t, Vs = U~(J.,g.)(ht) 
'VhtEHt. 
For T = 0 and ht E ht, (8) reduces to: 
d n +1 d d)) AVs = A S(.5Vs + .5(1 - VB + A SVs . (9)n+ +1 n+ +1 
For T = 0 and ht E Ht, (8) reduces to: 
n d d AVs =~S(.5Vs + .5(1 - VB)) + ASVs . (10)
n+"-1 n+ 
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Since "11.,9. == 1, for ht E fIt we have U'h(I.. ,g.. )(ht ) = .MV~ + .515(1 - V;). For T = 0 we 
have 
V; == .MV~ + .515(1- V;). (11) 
In any market equilibrium (I.. ,g.. ) the values V;, Vs, and V~ satisfy (9)-(11). Since these three 
equations have a unique solution the market equilibrium is unique. 0 
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider a generation T seller with history ht E Hb. Since all buyers 
employ the same stationary strategy g.. , there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to 
strategies where, when selected to propose, the seller either offers V~ or makes an unacceptable 
offer. Therefore, the seller's problem of choosing an optimal strategy is equivalent to a discounted 
dynamic programming problem with four states and with two actions {stop, continue} where 
each state is defined as follows: In state 1 the seller is matched and is to make an offer. In state 
2 the seller is matched and is to respond to an offer of V;. In state 3 the seller is unmatched 
and in state 4 the seller has exited the market. 
In state 1, stop corresponds to offering V~ and exiting the market (the next state is 4). 
Continue at state 1 corresponds to offering less than F~ in which case the seller's match 
ends without trade. Since "11.,9. == 1 the next state is 1 with probability! n~!~l' is 2 with 
probability! n~!~l , and is 3 with probability n+~+l' 
In state 2, stop corresponds to accepting an offer of V; while continue corresponds to reject-
ing such an offer. The transition probabilities are the same at state 2 as at state 1 for each of 
the actions. In state 3, since "11.,9. == 1, the transition probabilities to states 1, 2, 3 and 4 are, 
respectively, ! n~A' ! n~A' n~A' and O. State 4 is an absorbing state. 
The optimality equations are: 
V(l) - max {I - V~ +bV(4),! n~!~l bV(l) + ! n~!~l bV(2) + n+~+l bV(3)} 
V(2) - max {V; +bV(4),! n~!~l bV(l) + ! n~!~l bV(2) + n+~+l bV(3)} 
V(3) - ! n~A bV(l) + ! n~A bV(2) + n~A bV(3) 
V(4) - bV(4) 
A stationary policy is a function f: {I, 2, 3, 4} -+ {stop, continue} which gives the action taken 
as a function of the state. By Theorem 2.2 of Ross [6] there is a stationary optimal policy. We 
now show that the policy f(l) = f(2) = stop is optimal. (The actions taken at states 3 and 
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4 do not affect the value of a policy.) The value of this policy at state i, denoted by ~s(i), is 
given by the solution to the following system 
~s(1) - 1 - VJ + h~s(4) 
~s(2) - V; +h~B(4) 
~s(3) - ~ n~~ h~s(1) +! n~~ h~B(2) + n~~ h~s(3) 
~s(4) - h~s(4) 
This system has a unique solution: ~B(1) = 1 - VJ, ~s(2) = V;, ~s(3) = Vs (which follows 
from (10)), and ~s(4) = o. 
By Proposition 4.1 of Ross on policy improvement, if: 
d { d 1 n+l d 1 n+l d A }1- VB = max 1- VB'-2 A h(l- VB) +- hVs + hVs (12)
n+ +1 2n+A+l n+A+l 
and 
d { d 1 n+l d 1 n+l d A }Vs = max Vs, -2 A 1h(1 - VB) + -2 A 1hVs + A hVs. (13)
n+ + n+ + n+ +1 
then f is an optimal policy. Now, from (9) the second argument in the maximum in (12) and 
(13) equals V;, and so (13) clearly holds. Equation (12) holds since 1 - VJ1 > V;. 
Therefore, for a history ht E Hb the strategy f .. is optimal. For any history ht E Hh, the 
argument above shows that the value of the optimal policy following rejection of an offer is V;. 
Thus f .. is optimal for such histories since it calls for the seller to accept offers of V; or greater 
and reject all other offers. The symmetric argument establishes the optimality of g.. for each 
buyer. 0 
References 
[1] Anderson, B. (1978): "An Elementary Core Equivalence Theorem," Econometrica, 46, 1483-
1487. 
[2] Feldman, M. and C. Gilles. (1985): "An Expository Note on Individual Risk without Ag-
gregate Uncertainty" , Journal of Economic Theory, 35, 26-32. 
[3] Gale, D. (1986): "A Simple Characterization of Bargaining Equilibrium in A Large Market 
Without the Assumption of Dispersed Characteristics," Working Paper 86-05, Center for 
Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, University of Pennsylvania. 
20 
[4] Gale, D. (1987): "Limit Theorems for Markets with Sequential Bargaining," Journal of 
Economic Theory, 43, 20-54. 
[5] Hildenbrand, W. (1974): Core and Equilibria of an Economy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
[6] Ross, S. (1983): Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Academic Press, New 
York. 
[7] Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein. (1990): Bargaining and Markets, Academic Press, New 
York. 
[8] Rubinstein, A. and A. Wolinsky. (1985): "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargain-
ing," Econometrica, 53, 1133-1150. 
[9] Wolinsky, Asher. (1987): "Matching, Search, and Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, 
42, 311-333. 
21 
